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I. INTRODUCTION: AN AGE FOR TULIP BULB SALESMEN
The last quarter century or so has been a period of extraordinary national
hubris. That hubris was reflected in the widely shared and self-congratulatory
belief that the death of Marxism proved that its adversary, our Capitalism, is
the true path to public virtue and social welfare. Since about 1980, we have
been insistently assured that we will all prosper most and enjoy life best if we
will just allow the markets of the world to apply their magical unseen hands.
Freedom of contract, the Nineteenth century notion definitively deflated by
Roscoe Pound in 1909,1 was revived and elevated to the level in many minds of
one of the Four Freedoms for which World War II was fought.'
An appropriate insignia for this recent period is the tulip bulb, an emblem
redolent of the obsession of the Dutch people during a time in the Seventeenth
century when that country experienced its embarrassment of riches.3 The com-
parable obsession of our time was that with "dot-corn" investments. The lesson
to be re-learned from recent experience is that effective law enforcement is
needed to control the behavior of the sharks found in every marketplace. Eco-
nomic power is, like any other form of power, subject to abuse, as most Ameri-
cans well understood a century ago.
The policy assuring unfettered freedom of contract is, for that reason, one
of the bigger tulip bulbs of our time, begetting a false faith in deregulation in all
its forms. The poster boy of our Tulip Bulb Era is Kenneth Lay, the leader of
Enron, an institution resembling a Seventeenth century tulip bulb in its incredi-
ble overvaluation. Mr. Lay and his associates were the utmost champions of
the principle of deregulation except when regulation was to Enron's own
advantage.4 Just as a bed of tulips can be very ornamental, some forms of
* Professor of Law, Duke University. With help from Matt Greenley, Duke Law Class of
2003. Although attention is called to federal legislation enacted in November 2002, this
article does not otherwise reflect recent developments after September 2002.
1 See Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454. See also Edwin W. Patterson,
The Delivery of A Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HAmv. L. REv. 198 (1908-1909); Friedrich
Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L.
REV. 629, 632 (1943); W. David Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48
S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1974); Lewis A. Komhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64
CAL. L. REV. 1151 (1976).
2 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987); G. Richard
Shell, Contracts in the Modem Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1993).
3 For an account of the Dutch tulip market, see SIMON SCHAMA, THE EMBARRASSMENT OF
RicmEs 350-66 (1987).
4 See The Newshour, (Public Television Broadcast, Feb. 22, 2002).
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deregulation can be very beneficial to the public; but as a broad policy uncriti-
cally acclaimed, it is moral and political snake oil.
II. THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF PRIVATE LAW ENFORCEMENT
Associated with our momentary blindness to the realities of marketplace
predation has been a reaction against important features of our legal traditions
and of the profession bearing much of the burden of defending people from
sharks. Standing at the head of that reaction and leading the assault on laws
enacted to control business sharks has been our Supreme Court of the United
States.5
The Court's assault on business regulation has often seemed to be unwit-
ting, the product of a shared ignorance of the realities of the human condition
as experienced by ordinary mortals and a timely, if misplaced, confidence in
the enduring virtues of the freedom of contract empowering business to shape
the rights of lesser citizens. Justices have consistently explained their actions
through assertions about the world in which instruments purporting to be con-
tracts are made that are at odds with manifest reality. Their program has been
no less improvident because of their apparent innocence of motive. They have
led the federal judiciary to foster lawlessness in the relationships between the
corporate champions of free enterprise and the consumers, patients, debtors,
employees, franchisees, and others over whom they exercise economic
dominion.
Central to the Court's unwisdom has been its failure to notice the impor-
tance of private law enforcement in the American constitutional scheme. The
willingness of the American people to tolerate the aggressive conduct of much
American business has been fostered by their sense that the law is theirs and is
available to deter and remediate the ubiquitous, predatory instincts and conduct
of business. Through most of the Twentieth century, to secure fair dealing in
the marketplace, Americans fearing economic bullies have relied neither on the
charity of those who write contracts nor on the integrity of a bureaucracy regu-
lating them. They have depended primarily on the private bar and the civil
jury, institutions that cannot be controlled by economic barons in the ways that
govemmental regulators sometimes can.
This American tradition of private law enforcement has roots in Eight-
eenth century mistrust of government. It is an indirect result of the schemes of
checks and balances, designed to prevent any part of our federal, state, or local
governments from gaining too much political power over the people or, inci-
dentally, predatory business enterprises. Among those checks and balances,
I For a review of the Court's decisions through 1995, see Paul D. Carrington & Paul
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 331 (1997). See also Jean R. Ster-
nlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Bind-
ing Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on Judicial
ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture, or
Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 297 (1996); Thomas E. Carbonneau,
Arbitration and the U.S. Supreme Court: A Plea for Statutory Reform, 5 0I-o ST. J. ON
Disp. RESOL. 231 (1989).
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none has been more important than the right to jury trial in civil cases.6 The
universal affirmation of that right in both state and federal constitutions assured
separation of powers within the judicial branches,7 limiting the power of both
state and federal judges, virtually all of whom bring partisan political creden-
tials to their work and who are therefore at least in appearance vulnerable to
domination by those with great economic power. Eighteenth century Ameri-
cans insisted on the civil jury as an institution less vulnerable to bribery or
intimidation than any other institution of the governments they were creating.8
Trial by jury served then, and serves now, to establish democracy at the court-
house, assuring individual citizens that they have a convenient, independent,
and apolitical forum to hear grievances they may have against all kinds of
predators.
In the Nineteenth century, law enforcement by private lawyers and civil
juries came to be recognized as an essential element of our legal system. That
recognition led to the development of the American rule against fee-shifting,9
the allowance of contingent fees,1 ° and the award of bounties to lawyers and
their clients who pursued predatory business with claims of rights created to
constrain the excesses of economic power. Among federal statutes creating
civil bounties were the voting rights law of 1870,1 the Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887,12 and the Sherman Act of 1890.1" The first two employed a one-
way fee shift, so that the bounty was paid directly to the plaintiffs lawyer; the
third introduced the concept of treble damages. The English tradition of exem-
plary damages available in all manner of trespass actions was also dusted off
and given wider use.14
Private law enforcement was further enhanced in the Twentieth century
with the developments of discovery rules, enabling counsel to investigate
abuses of economic power,"5 and the class action rule, facilitating the aggrega-
tion of small claims against predators and thus making the assertion of such
6 Morris S. Arnold, The Civil Jury in Historical Perspective, in THE AMERICAN CIVIL JURY
9 (1987). All eleven of the states having constitutions predating the federal constitution
guaranteed the right to trial by jury in civil cases. A compilation is THE CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (E. Duycinck ed., 1820).
7 Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
87, 106.
8 See generally Charles Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639, 670-705 (1973); Stanton D. Krauss, The Original Understanding of the
Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 412 (1999).
9 John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47-1
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 17 (1984). On the uniqueness of the American rule, see Wemer
Pfennigstorf, The European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47-1 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 37, 42 (1984).
10 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 527 (1987); F.B. MACKINNON,
CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 36-39 (1964); HERBERT M. KRITZER, RHETORIC
AND REALITY ... UsES AND ABUSES ... CONTINGENCIES AND CERTAINTIES: THE AMERICAN
CONTINGENT FEE IN OPERATION (1996).
11 Act of May 31, 1870, Ch.16, Stat. 140 (repealed 1894).
12 Act of February 4, 1887, Ch. 24 Stat. 379.
13 Act of July 2, 1890, Ch. 26, Stat. 209, 210.
14 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 16 (4th ed. 2000).
15 This was, of course, the major consequence of the promulgation of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938. The pertinent rules are Fed. R. Civ. P. 36-37. See generally ROB-
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claims economically viable. 16 There was also enlarged use of the one-way fee
shift as a bounty to successful hunters of business predators.'" By 1970, the
private lawsuit was widely recognized in the United States as the most effective
means of controlling the abuse of economic power. And American courts were
recognized around the world as those most hospitable to individuals who have
experienced harm at the hands of economic sharks and the most effective at
protecting their interests by deterring economic predation."
This unique hospitality of our courts has served to compensate for defects
in our legislative and executive branches, deliberately weakened by the Foun-
ders with their scheme of checks and balances. It also compensates for a major
flaw in our political process that has appeared in the last half century, i.e.,
expensive political campaigns requiring large contributions from persons and
groups advancing special interests,' 9 including those of diverse business inter-
ests, thus enhancing the political power of those with wealth and weakening the
political power of those lacking it. While legislatures and politically responsive
bureaucracies have been inhibited by the influence of special interests, the state
and federal courts have stood as the political institutions most responsive to the
concerns and interests of individual citizens who work for a living.
This traditional political role of American courts has, of course, always
been regretted by those who put their faith in the beauty of market economics,
freedom of contract, and the profit motive as means to achieve the public good.
Those views have often prevailed in our tulip bulb age, and they generated an
epidemic of deregulation, withdrawing the executive branches of federal and
state governments from many programs of law designed to protect the public.2 °
Deregulation was accompanied by plentiful journalism reporting a much exag-
ERT WYNESS MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
201-29 (1952).
16 The important development in 1966 was the promulgation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
That amendment was made to facilitate the aggregation of small claims against a common
malefactor. See also Bryant Garth et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General:
Perspectives from an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 353
(1988); Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and
the "Class Action Problems", 92 HARV. L. REV. 664 (1979). On the history of class actions,
see STEPHEN YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION
(1987).
17 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47-1 LAW &
CoNTEMP. PROBS. 139, 147-48 (1984).
18 The noted Lord Dunning observed, "As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn
to the United States." Smith Kline & French Lab. Ltd. v. Bloch, 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (Eng. C.
A. 1983).
19 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Big Money in Texas Judicial Elections: The Sickness and
Its Remedies, 53 SMU L. REV. 263, 266-67 (2000); Paul D. Carrington & Adam Long,
Selecting Pennsylvania Judges in the Twenty-first Century, 106 DICKINSON L. REV. 743
(2002). Paul D. Carrington & Adam Long, The Independence and Accountability of the
Ohio Supreme Court: Recalling the Work of Frederick Grimke, CAP. U. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2003) (manuscript on file with author).
20 See generally WILLIS EMMONS, THE EVOLVING BARGAIN: STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF
DEREGULATION AND PRIVATIZATION (2000); ALAN SHIPMAN, THE MARKET REVOLUTION
AND ITS LIMITS: A PRICE FOR EVERYTHING (1999); DANIEL A. YERGIN & JOSEPH STANIS-
LAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKET-
PLACE IN REMAKING THE MODERN WORLD (1998); IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (Donald R. Harris et
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gerated law explosion and dramatizing allegedly extravagant awards and law-
yers' fees said to disable American business from competing effectively in the
world markets.21
At the same time that many of our leaders disparaged the instruments of
private law enforcement, they were prone to glorify corporate management. A
measure of that glorification has been the astonishing levels of compensation
conferred on corporate executives by their interlocking boards of directors. A
few years ago, we observed the merger of Daimler Benz and Chrysler resulting
in the consolidation of their management teams. A major problem during this
consolidation was that Chrysler executives received compensation packages
many multiples of those of their German colleagues, despite the fact that the
German factory workers received compensation substantially higher than that
of their American co-employees.22 This reality of executive compensation
reflected a tradition of mutual indulgence infecting American boardrooms,
whose members are like Justices removed from much contact with the human
condition by guarded subdivisions and skyboxes.
Congress had a hand in the development of this elevated managerial class.
The system of tax incentives set forth in the Internal Revenue Code in the last
quarter of the Twentieth century23 not only resulted in extravagant levels of
compensation for top managers, but also encourages predatory behavior by the
corporations over which they preside. This is a manifest effect of provisions
providing capital gains treatment for income acquired from the exercise of
stock options provided as part of a package of executive compensation, a sys-
tem known as "stealth compensation. '24 The stock option prods management
to secure short-term profits, thereby inflating the current market price of the
securities they have rights to sell.2 5 Managers are thus induced to leave to their
successors any public relations or other secondary problems resulting from con-
duct imposing costs or harms on those over whom they can exercise economic
al. eds., 1992); DEREGULATION OR REREGULATION? REGULATORY REFORM IN EUROPE AND
THE UNITED STATES (Giandomenico Majone ed., 1990).
2' E.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (Penguin Books 1991). See also STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE
MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM (1995); ELLEN E. SWARD, THE
DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 101-145 (Durham 2001); Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere:
The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENY. U. L. REv. 77 (1993); Marc Galanter, Real
World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1109-12 (1996); Michael J.
Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System - And
Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
22 Brian Coleman & Gregory L. White, Daimler Chrysler Pay Scale to Lean Toward U.S.,
WALL ST. J. Aug. 7, 1998, at A3; Scott Miller, Daimler Sets Higher Bonus In Germany,
WALL ST. J. Feb. 9, 2001, at A8.
23 The implications of the tax treatment of stock options were not well understood when it
was liberalized. See U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, Hear-
ings on Tax Treatment of Options to Buy and Sell Stock, Securities or Commodities, 94th
Cong. (1976). There were, of course, other motives in encouraging ownership to share prof-
its with managers.
24 United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management, Hearings on Stealth Compensation of Corporate Executives:
Federal Treatment of Stock Options, 102nd Cong. (1992).
25 See generally MARIA RUTH BUENAVENTURA & CHARLES PECK, STOCK OPTIONS: MOTI-
VATING THROUGH OWNERSHIP (The Conference Board, Rept. No. 1040, 1993).
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power. It is likely also a factor in the short-term perspective of American man-
agers that so much publicly held stock is in the hands of portfolio managers
who demand short-term profits to soothe the anxieties of their investors.
One can then imagine the management of an automobile company respon-
sible for making and selling ill designed sports utility vehicles having a ten-
dency to roll over. Our tax law and our institutional investors urge the directors
of such a firm to reward the responsible managers for postponing revelation of
information regarding the dangerous defect at least long enough that those
officers and directors responsible for the resulting harms can exercise their
options and thereby obtain an early and comfortable retirement. Even The
Economist, ever an advocate of extensive freedom of contract, has decried our
system of executive compensation as an inducement to economic
recklessness.26
It is in the context of these developments that the actions of the Supreme
Court ought be seen. In the apparent belief that unrestrained profit seeking
brings out the best in corporate management, the Court has established its
"national policy" allowing economic predators to contract at least partially out
of the system of effective private law enforcement, thereby exposing consum-
ers, employees, small businesses, and other persons of limited economic bar-
gaining power to a thousand wounds.
A. The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925
The instrument of the Court's mischief has been the Federal Arbitration
Act of 1925,27 a statute re-written by the Court a half-century after its enact-
ment and applied not only to trump later-enacted federal laws but also to pre-
empt all state laws enacted to protect citizens and small business from the pred-
atory impulses of some business executives, features no elected body would
ever enact.
The 1925 Act expressed the limited purpose of Congress to reverse a rule
imposed by some federal courts, one declared under the authority of Swift v.
Tyson28 to be a rule of federal common law, a form of jurisprudence eradicated
by the Supreme Court thirteen years after enactment of the Arbitration Act.
29
Had Erie been decided fifteen years earlier, there would have been no Federal
Arbitration Act and the present subject would have been left in the hands of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws where, in the
constitutional scheme of things, it would seem to belong.3 ° It was an oversight
on the part of Congress that the statute was not repealed in 1940, for after Erie,
it had lost its purpose.
The objectionable rule of federal common law that Congress sought to
reverse was one holding that predispute agreements to arbitrate are revocable.
26 January 19, 2002, at 9.
27 9 U.S.C. § I et seq. (2002).
28 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
29 See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
30 On the development of the Uniform Arbitration Act, see IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN
ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION, INTERNATIONALIZATION 15-133
(1992); Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 Yale L.J. 595
(1927).
[Vol. 3:259
Winter 2002/2003] "NATIONAL POLICY" OF SELF-DEREGULATION 265
That rule was often observed by Nineteenth century courts as a protection of
improvident individuals from their tendency to underestimate the value and
importance of clauses reducing their procedural rights in an unforeseen dispute
over the performance of the contract. It recognized the limits to the foresight,
interest, and energy most individuals bring to the planning of transactions and
events with respect to the remote possibility that they might lead to disputes,
limits that are not imposed on parties who are engaged in one of many similar
transactions, some of which are certain to end in controversy.
This common law rule was associated with the doctrine that arbitration is a
method of dispute resolution entirely dependent on private contract.3" There
were no rules or standards imposed on arbitrators and there could be no review
of their awards unless the contract explicitly so provided. A different scheme
was generally found in legal systems not rooted in English common law but in
the Roman civil law tradition; the continental scheme enforced predispute arbi-
tration agreements but imposed legal restraints on arbitrators to assure their
compliance with the governing code provisions.3" English law was amended in
1950 to convert arbitration into a legal process.3 3 That did not happen in the
United States.
As re-written by the Supreme Court a half century after its enactment, the
1925 Act now directs state as well as federal courts to enforce predispute arbi-
tration clauses applicable not only to disputes arising out of the contract, but
also to disputes arising out of the enforcement of legislation enacted to protect
one party to a contract from the other, and (unlike the practice in most other
countries) relieves arbitrators of a duty to adhere to the law. By this recon-
struction of an old law, the Court has empowered those with economic power
to use contracts to diminish the enforceability of laws enacted to inhibit their
power.
The common law rule addressed by the 1925 Act was partially obsolesced
by the railroad. A manufacturer in New York and a wholesaler in Iowa had
trouble making deals if each was at risk of being sued in the other's state's
courts. They needed to create a private forum more to be trusted than the
courts of either, a problem soon to be encountered in international trade. Many
commercial states therefore departed from the common law rule against
enforcement of predispute agreements restricting access to legal forums and
allowed merchants to make enforceable predispute agreements designating a
forum to enforce the terms of the contracts of which they were a part. But
some federal courts declined to adhere to local state law as so modified. Con-
gress therefore sought to liberate business from what had become an anachro-
nism. While thus allowing them to make predispute agreements to arbitrate
that could be enforced in federal as well as state courts, Congress did nothing to
assure that arbitrators would be bound by law, surely because no one then envi-
31 Sayre, supra note 30, at 598.
32 See generally A.J. VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958:
TOWARDS A UNIFORM JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 359-82 (1981). On the legalistic tradition
of international arbitration, see YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER 31-114 (1999).
33 Arbitration Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 27, § 21.
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sioned the possibility that a Court would require anyone to arbitrate claims
other than those between merchants involving alleged breaches of contract. Its
law was intended for the use of businessmen who were presumably able to
evaluate, and sometimes to negotiate, contract provisions controlling the reso-
lution of contract disputes in neutral private forums. If businessmen wanted to
make elastic deals to be enforced by neutrals at some place equally remote to
the parties, who were not bound by rules of court and were free to make com-
promise awards, that was not a concern to Congress.
Thus, in its first half century, the Federal Arbitration Act posed no serious
problems for anyone. It was interpreted in a manner generally consistent with
state law expressed in many states in a uniform law upholding predispute arbi-
tration agreements in commercial contracts.3 4
Meanwhile, however, the role of private law enforcement was steadily
growing in its importance as a distinctive feature of our political system. While
the New Deal was a moment of enthusiasm for the administrative process, 35 by
1950 most American legislators had come to suspect (as had Eighteenth and
Nineteenth century Americans) that administrative agencies at all levels of gov-
ernments of separated powers tend to become too closely allied with those
whom they regulate to be as effective as they need to be.36
In the middle of the Twentieth century, it was consistently held in both
federal and state courts that claims arising under state or federal laws enacted
to protect weaker parties to contracts (to be distinguished from claims seeking
to enforce contracts) are not subject to binding arbitration unless both parties
agree to resolve an existing dispute by such private means. Among the federal
statutory rights explicitly held to be immune to predispute binding arbitration
were claims arising under the Fair Employment Practices Act,37 the Securities
Act,3 8 and the antitrust laws.3 9
Similarly, bills of lading and passenger tickets had long been subjected to
statutory regulation.40 No one can be reasonably expected to read such instru-
ments recording routine events in the conduct of commercial carriage; federal
law has accordingly long forbidden the use of such instruments by carriers to
disclaim or limit liability. 4 1 Notwithstanding federal laws proscribing provi-
sions that "lessen" the carriers' liabilities, and long-honored decisions invali-
dating choice of forum and arbitration clauses in such contracts, the Court has
in recent times reduced the ability of bailors to enforce their property rights by
14 IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION, NATIONALIZATION AND
INTERNATIONALIZATION 122-33 (1992).
31 See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938).
36 Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevaluation, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1107 (1954).
37 E.g., Donohue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 138 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1943).
38 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). The Court there concluded that "the intention of
Congress concerning the sale of securities is better carried out by holding invalid . . . an
agreement for arbitration of issues arising under the Act." Id. at 438.
39 E.g., Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., Inc., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
40 Michael F. Sturley, The History of COGSA and the Hague Rules, 22 J. MAR. L. & COM. 1
(1991).
41 E.g., Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (2000).
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requiring them to arbitrate in compliance with clauses buried in the fine print of
the instrument given them when they entrusted their goods to the carriers.42
It seemed obvious as recently as 1975 that laws enacted in the public inter-
est to confer rights on individuals or small business should not be defeated by
contract provisions making such laws inapplicable to the contracting parties. If
parties can agree not to be bound by the otherwise applicable antitrust laws or
minimum wage laws of the United States, many of the business practices con-
strained by those laws could be shielded from enforcement of those laws by the
terms of contracts between the predator and the victim, who would be required
to consent to victimization as a condition of doing any business or work at
all.43 And if contracting parties could not agree to nullify regulatory laws, it
followed that neither could a business self-deregulate by imposing contract pro-
visions stripping weaker parties of procedural rights needed to enforce their
statutory rights. Predispute arbitration clauses having that effect were not
explicitly forbidden in Twentieth century legislation only because no legisla-
tors, judges, or lawyers making or enforcing federal laws imagined the enforce-
ment of such clauses. The Supreme Court acknowledged this general principle
in 1953 with respect to the Securities Act.an That decision was overruled in
1989 as the Court extended its "national policy" impeding private law
enforcement.45
The shared assumption that mandatory predispute arbitration is unsuited to
the enforcement of statutory rights conferred on weak parties to contracts is
also expressed in international law. Article V of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, promul-
gated in 1958 and ratified by the United States in 1970,46 relieves the courts of
ratifying nations from any obligation to enforce arbitration awards that are con-
trary to the public policy of the nation in which enforcement is sought. Article
II of the Convention requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate only mat-
ters that are "capable of settlement by arbitration."4 7 For example, many
nations regard disputes between employers and employees as non-arbitrable,
and awards resulting from mandatory arbitration as non-enforceable on grounds
of public policy.4 8 The Convention thus gives the force of international law to
the restraint on freedom of contract that was a part of the federal law in 1970.
42 E.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995); see
also Elizabeth A. Clark, Foreign Arbitration Clauses and Foreign Forum Selection Clauses
in Bills of Lading Governed by COGSA: Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky
Reefer, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REv. 483.
11 See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1373-1544 (1950). See also Edward L. Rubin, Towards
A General Theory of Waiver, 28 UCLA L. REv. 478 (1981). Cf. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972); see also D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188 (1972).
44 Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-37. Cf. Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263
(1949).
" See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
46 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Dec. 29, 1970, Art. V, para. 2, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
41 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Dec. 29, 1970, Art. II, para. 1, 21 U.S.T. 2517.
48 Justice Stevens cites Belgian, Italian, and German examples in Mitsubishi Motors Corp.
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 660-61, n. 35-36 (1985). See GARY B.
BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTARY &
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Had the Convention superseded American laws limiting freedom of contract in
that respect, there would have been substantial, indeed overwhelming, opposi-
tion to ratification without a reservation to protect the system of private
enforcement of such regulatory laws as the antitrust or minimum wage laws.
The Court, while giving sweeping application to the 1925 Act as an
expression of a "national policy" favoring private dispute resolution (a policy
first discovered in the statute in 1983"9), acknowledged that the Act does not
apply "where Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.' '50 However, the Court has
not yet encountered a statute that appeared to it to evince such an intention.
There were, indeed, several important laws enacted by Congress around the
time of the ratification of the international treaty that would, at the time of their
enactment, have been deemed (like the antitrust and securities laws) not capa-
ble of enforcement by arbitration. Let us consider how the federal courts have
effected impairments of their enforceability by applying the Court's "national
policy."
B. The Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act of 1956
No one in 1970 could have supposed that a claim arising under the federal
Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act of 195651 was arbitrable pursuant to a
predispute arbitration clause in a dealership contract. That 1956 statute
reflected the widely shared perception that private enforcement of law is neces-
sary in America if small business is to be protected from predatory big busi-
ness.52 It commissioned automobile dealers and their lawyers to cabin the
economic power of manufacturers as private attorneys general. Dealers and
lawyers enforcing that law are not merely private seekers of gain but are pro-
tectors of what Congress perceived to be the public interest in the sustenance of
locally-owned businesses.
The legislation was drafted in the chambers of Senator Joseph O'Mahoney
of Wyoming. It was designed to strengthen in a general way the legal position
of the automobile dealers in their relationship to manufacturers, especially the
positions of dealers in small towns who sell relatively few cars and who
accordingly have weak bargaining positions in their relations with the manufac-
turers from whom they buy their inventory.5 ' Manufacturers are tempted to
favor larger dealers with better supplies of the best-selling models, and to dump
on small dealers the inventory that is hardest to sell. The public interest served
MATERIALS 527 (2d ed. 2000). With respect to the enforceability of adhesion contracts, even
in international commerce, compare CIVIL CODE OF ITALY, Arts. 1341-1342.
41 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). In 1985,
the Court proclaimed, contrary to its legislative history, that the Act reflected a "congres-
sional desire to enforce agreements into which parties had entered." Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U. S. 213, 220 (1985).
50 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 628.
51 15 U.S.C. § 1221 (1998).
52 See generally Friedrich Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by
Contract, 66 YALE L.J. 1135 (1957).
13 See Hanley v. Chrysler Motors Corp., Inc., 433 F.2d 708 (10th Cir. 1970); Woodward v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 298 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1962); Bateman v. Ford Motor Co., 302 F.2d 63
(3d Cir. 1962).
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by regulatory law is the preservation of a measure of autonomy in local busi-
ness, thus protecting our communities - especially smaller ones - from the
deadening effect of making all their citizens the servants of enormous
enterprises.
The substantive provisions of the 1956 Act thus shared the purpose of the
federal antitrust laws to prevent brutal deployment of economic power. They
were crafted with a jury trial in mind. Manufacturers were simply enjoined to
deal with dealers "in good faith," 54 and afforded a defense if they could prove a
lack of "good faith" on the part of the dealer." That elastic standard, like the
law of negligence, was designed to invoke the moral judgment of the commu-
nity served by the law. A litigant mistrustful of a politically appointed or
elected judge was expected to demand trial by jury.
The standard of good faith was perhaps correctly interpreted narrowly to
forbid only threats or unreasonable coercion by the manufacturer. The com-
mon form of coercion was to require small dealers to buy more cars or cars of
different models than they were able to sell. Few "good faith" cases under the
Act have actually been presented to a jury, and fewer still are the verdicts for
dealers that have withstood post-trial motions or appeals.5 6 Yet, courts
declined to apply any special standard for the review of verdicts rendered on
claims brought under the Act; and if there was evidence of coercion, good faith
was an issue for the jury.5 7
Although the 1956 Act does not explicitly authorize injunctive relief, pre-
liminary injunctions have been afforded to dealers who appeared to be victims
of coercion or intimidation.58 The Supreme Court of Minnesota, deciding a
case brought under the federal law but in a state court, held that courts are
empowered by the Act to enjoin a dealership termination that would not meet
the standard of "good faith."
59
The Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act did not produce a flood of
litigation.6" It did cause manufacturers to modify their business practices
favorably to the interests of smaller dealers, and it did change the tone of the
conversation when dealers were bargaining with manufacturers over diverse
issues arising in the conduct of their shared enterprise.
Because the federal law was narrowly interpreted, there remained griev-
ances by local automobile dealers who were overborne by national and interna-
tional manufacturers. States enacted similar laws and, by 1990, every state
except Alaska had enacted a statute on the subject. The federal statute was
51 See, e.g., Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v. Rohisen, 360 F.2d 437, 435 (1st Cir. 1966)
(rejecting the argument that this standard was unconstitutionally vague).
55 15 U.S.C. § 1222 (1998).
56 E.g., Kotula v. Ford Motor Co., 338 F.2d 732 (8th Cir. 1964).
57 E.g., Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1970).
58 E.g., Bateman, 302 F.2d at 66.
59 Dahlberg Bros., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 137 N.W.2d 314, 326 (1965).
60 Louis Kenworthy, Stewart Macaulay & Joel Rogers, "The More Things Change" - Busi-
ness Litigation and Governance in the Automobile Industry, 21 LAW & Soc. INQ. 660, 667
(1996).
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explicit that no state law protective of dealers was preempted by it. 6 1 Some
state laws provided more explicit standards than Senator O'Mahoney's "good
faith" standard. Some created administrative agencies to hear disputes between
manufacturers and dealers.6 2 All of this legislation, like the federal law, was
intended to limit the manufacturers' freedom of contract. In no state was there
a "flood" of cases under state laws. The primary effect of the state legislation,
like that of the federal, was to alter bargaining positions of the parties and
reduce the vulnerability of franchisees to arbitrary use of the economic power
of manufacturers.
Only one case involving the federal automobile dealers' statute has
reached the Supreme Court of the United States, 63 and the Court decided no
issue regarding it. So far as one can tell, the Justices have never given serious
thought to the problem of the relationship between local dealers and manufac-
turers or to that of effective enforcement of laws enacted to regulate that rela-
tionship. The one case they reviewed involved a dispute between a Mitsubishi
dealer in San Juan, Puerto Rico and the Japanese manufacturer. Mitsubishi
initiated arbitration pursuant to the dealership agreement, which provided for
arbitration in Japan of all disputes arising between the parties, and it brought an
action in the federal court in Puerto Rico to compel Soler to arbitrate. Soler
counterclaimed for defamation and violations of the Sherman Act, the Federal
Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act, the Puerto Rico Competition Act, and
the Puerto Rico Dealers' Contracts Act. In its defense, Soler alleged that Mit-
subishi had forced it to buy more cars than he could sell. The franchise agree-
ment provided for arbitration in Japan. The District Court stayed its proceeding
pending arbitration of the dealer's claims. The Supreme Court held that the
dealer would indeed have to arbitrate his antitrust counterclaim against the Jap-
anese manufacturer in Japan, thus overruling earlier decisions holding that anti-
trust claims are not subject to predispute arbitration clauses. 64 It offered the
Puerto Rican dealer the reassurance that the arbitrators in Japan would faith-
fully enforce the Sherman Act, calculating that the task for the Japanese arbitra-
tors was not different from that performed by federal courts discerning foreign
law in the manner provided by Federal Rule 44. 1.65 Perhaps a transcript would
be made, the Court assured itself, the three Japanese arbitrators would prepare
an opinion, and the federal court in Puerto Rico would review their award for
errors of law.66 If such review of an award were indeed to be provided, this
would be an extraordinary revision of traditional arbitration law in the United
States.6 7
61 See 15 U.S.C. § 1225 (1998) ("This chapter shall not invalidate any provision of the laws
of any State except insofar as there is a direct conflict between an express provision of this
chapter and an express provision of State law which can not be reconciled.").
62 E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-14-101 et seq. (2002).
63 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 614 (1985).
64 E.g., Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., Inc., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
65 Fed. R. Civ. P. 44(1).
66 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 634 n.18.
67 IN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, & THOMAS J. SYIPANOWICH, FEDERAL ARBiTRA-
TION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT
§ 16.3.2.2 (1999).
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Not presented to the Court6 8 was the question of whether the dealer's
claim under the Automobile Dealer's Day in Court Act should be decided in
the first instance by an arbitrator in Japan. The Court justified its decision with
respect to the antitrust laws by dismissing the public purpose of the law, deny-
ing the role of the San Juan dealer as a private attorney general, and declaring
the purpose of the antitrust laws to be merely the compensation of private vic-
tims that have a right to waive such recompense.6 9 That declaration entailed a
judicial rewriting of the antitrust laws having the specific effect of repealing the
treble damage provision, because of the general unavailability of that remedy in
any forum in Japan.7" If an automobile dealer can sell to the manufacturer, in
advance of needing them, its rights under the antitrust laws, it would seem to
follow that it can also sell its rights under the 1956 Act. Lower federal courts
have since so held,7" despite the manifest distortion of the term "day in court"
to mean a "day in arbitration" and the equally manifest impropriety of moving
the jury issue of "good faith" into a private forum. If such decisions are
upheld, the 1958 statute will have been trumped or superseded by a 1925 stat-
ute. The Court has not explained the jurisprudence reflected in this intellectual
gymnastic.
The National Automobile Dealers Association did not take the matter
lightly. Mandatory arbitration deprives them of the fruits of many years of
struggle in the corridors of Congress and our state legislatures. The Judiciary
Committee of the United States Senate unanimously reported a bill denoted as
the Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act of 2001.72 As
modified, it became law on November 2, 2002, and exempts controversies aris-
ing out of motor vehicle franchises, unless both parties consent in writing to use
arbitration to settle an existing controversy.7 3
68 Chrysler Corporation was also a party to the claim under the Act, but not to the arbitra-
tion clause.
69 Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 635.
70 C.f Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995) (holding that
New York law precluding arbitrators from awarding punitive damages is overridden by an
arbitration agreement governed by the FAA that authorizes that remedy). But see RONALD
A. BRAND, ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED STATES
JUDGMENTS ABROAD 51-192 (1992) (It is an extraordinary step to extend that decision to a
Japanese arbitral forum. It is generally established in international law that the powers of the
arbitrator are governed by the law of the place of the arbitration. Most and maybe all of the
countries with whom Americans regularly deal do not recognize the concept of the private
attorney general and they will not enforce an American judgment awarding treble damages,
much less provide such a remedy in their own courts or arbitral forums. This reflects the
entrenched principle that the courts of one nation do not enforce the penal or revenue laws of
another.).
71 See generally Bondy's Ford, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (M.D.
Ala. 2001).
72 Enacted as H.R. 2215, The 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriation Act.
71 S. 1140, 107th Cong. § 2 (2001) (Whenever a motor vehicle franchise contract provides
for the use of arbitration to resolve a controversy arising out of or relating to the contract,
arbitration may be used to settle such controversy only, if after such controversy arises, both
parties consent in writing to use arbitration to settle such controversy.).
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
C. The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act of 1978
In 1978, a similar federal law was enacted to protect owners and operators
of filling stations. The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act7 4 was enacted to
protect local businesses smaller than automobile dealers. It recognized their
"continuing vulnerability ... to the demands and actions of the franchisors,"
i.e., major oil companies who were their suppliers. This law was enacted in
response to predatory behavior by the oil companies during the petroleum
shortage caused by the OPEC conspiracy of the late 1970s. Like the law pro-
tecting automobile dealers, that Act plainly envisioned private enforcement in
law courts. The term "good faith" reappears as the standard of conduct to
which the local businessman may be held by a franchisor canceling or refusing
to renew a franchise.75 And the statute explicitly authorized equitable relief
against wrongful termination of a franchise.7 6 Some lawsuits resulted, but
hardly a flood. The statute succeeded in modifying the power relationships
between filling station operators and major oil companies.
The Supreme Court has never heard argument on a case brought under this
Act. And no court has yet been reported to hold that claims arising under it are
arbitrable pursuant to a predispute agreement. At least one major oil company,
ARCO, has written an arbitration clause into its franchise agreements. The
Ninth Circuit held that clause invalid because it was not merely an arbitration
clause; the features dooming its enforcement were that it explicitly reversed the
statute's provision for fee shifting, foreclosed the statutory provision for exem-
plary damages, and foreshortened the time for asserting a claim. 77 Whether in
light of the Supreme Court's re-writing of the 1925 Act the courts should
enforce a less overbearing arbitration clause in a petroleum dealer's franchise
agreement remains to be decided.
Unlike most federal commercial law including the Dealers' Day in Court
Act, the petroleum marketing law explicitly preempted otherwise applicable
state franchise laws limiting the right of the oil companies to terminate a
franchise.7 8 This had the effect of making the federal courts the forum of
choice for the entertainment of dealers' claims. The preemption provision was,
however, in keeping with long-established practice, read narrowly to retain in
force other state laws protecting franchisees. 79 The framework of state contract
and tort law remained in place.8" In 1994, the petroleum marketing act was
amended explicitly to preempt state laws requiring an oil company to pay for
the goodwill of a terminated dealership. 8 The policy of Congress in enacting
the law in 1978 was to add strength to the position of the vulnerable franchis-
74 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-06 (1998).
75 15 U.S.C. § 2802(b)(2)(B) (1998).
76 15 U.S.C. § 2805(b) (1998). See Moody v. Amoco Oil Co., 734 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir.
1984) (finding the section to include the possibility of a preliminary injunction).
77 Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 1994).
78 See 15 U.S.C. § 2806 (1998). See also In re Herbert, 806 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1986);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Va. Gasoline Marketers and Auto. Repair Ass'n, 34 F.3d 220, 227 (4th
Cir. 1994).
79 See Bellmore v. Mobil Oil Corp., 783 F.2d 300, 304 (2d Cir. 1986); Unocal Corp. v.
Kaabipour, 177 F.3d 755, 770-71 (9th Cir. 1999).
80 E.g., Carter v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 177 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
81 15 U.S.C. § 2806(a)(2) (1998).
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ees. It would be contrary to the purpose of that legislation for the courts to
weaken the position of franchisees by enforcing dispute resolution clauses
impeding the access of the franchisees to the federal judicial forum provided by
that Act in lieu of pre-then existing remedies available to franchisees under
state law. When Congress perceives a need to confer protection on the oil
companies from greedy filling station owners, it knows how to do that, as it did
in 1994.
D. The Truth in Lending Act of 1968
In 1968, Congress addressed the need to protect borrowers from deceitful
and overbearing terms written into loan agreements.8 2 The Truth in Lending
Act respected the freedom of the creditor and debtor to contract, but sought to
enable borrowers to understand the terms of loans so that comparison shopping
might be possible and so borrowers might know when they were victims of
usurious charges.
A problem faced by Congress was devising a suitable remedy for viola-
tions of the Act. Individuals victimized by violations of the law would have
difficulty in proving damages because they would have to show in what
respects they might have fared better if they had been more fully informed.
The solution reached was to provide penalties limited in amount to $1,000 to be
paid to a successful plaintiff, plus attorneys' fees.83
It was recognized at the outset that the primary method of enforcement of
the Act would be through the class action device created by the Supreme Court
in the 1966 amendment to Rule 23. Lobbyists for organizations of lenders were
horrified by their prospects. Their fears were overborne by the advocacy of the
Federal Reserve Board who reported that the class action would be indispensa-
ble to enforcement, affirming that its "threat elevates a possible Truth in Lend-
ing lawsuit from the ineffective 'nuisance' category to the type of suit which
has enough sting in it to assure that management will strive with diligence to
achieve compliance."8 4 The Act's sponsors reiterated this point. To reassure
lenders that they would not be exposed to massive penalties for trivial offenses,
a cap of $100,000 was imposed, to be raised in 1974 to $500,000.85
While the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Trade Commission were
assigned roles in the administration of the Act, enforcement was left largely to
private class action lawyers. The scheme, including class action enforcement,
was extended in a 1976 law to lease transactions. 86 As recently as the late
1990s, there were about a dozen reported class action cases a year brought to
enforce these laws.87 This was hardly a bursting of the floodgate, but it was a
sufficient level of regulatory activity to keep lenders at least somewhat on their
82 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1998).
83 See Richard B. Cappalli, Arbitration of Consumer Claims: The Sad Case of Two-Time
Victim Terry Johnson or Where Have You Gone Learned Hand?, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 366,
390-401 (2001) (recounting the legislative history of the act).
84 119 CONG. Rc. 25415 (July 23, 1973).
85 Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500 (1976).
86 15 U.S.C. §§ 1667(a)-(f) (1998).
87 F.T.C. ANN. REP. 59-61 (1998).
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toes in providing the necessary information to borrowers and to keep the law's
requirements in the public eye.
In recent years, some lenders and lessors have succeeded in substantially
deregulating themselves by barring suits to enforce the law. The trick is, of
course, the predispute arbitration clause that binds each debtor to pursue his
claim individually in a private arbitral forum created for him. This is a com-
plete bar to most valid claims because a $1,000 claim is, to almost everyone,
not worth asserting in arbitration or otherwise.
The practice of using arbitration to defeat Truth in Lending law has been
contested. But the court of appeals entertaining the issue found that Congress
has never explicitly prohibited individual arbitrations as a means of enforce-
ment, and therefore the "national policy favoring arbitration" made predispute
clauses enforceable notwithstanding their devastating effect on the legislative
scheme.88 The court followed the example of the Supreme Court in disregard-
ing the role of the class action plaintiff and counsel as a private attorney general
performing a public service in bringing to account those who violate the Act.89
E. The Magnuson-Moss Act of 1975
In 1975, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Act,90 applicable to con-
tracts for the sale of "consumer goods," and declared a national policy encour-
aging "warrantors to establish procedures whereby consumer disputes are fairly
and expeditiously settled through informal dispute settlement mechanisms."91
The Act does not apply to sellers of services except services of repair or main-
tenance of goods sold. It provides a federal judicial remedy for breaches of
express warranties, but authorizes sellers of consumer goods to contract for
private resolution of warranty disputes through non-binding arbitration if the
private forum offered to the consumer meets standards imposed by the Federal
Trade Commission. When such an informal forum is provided, consumers can
invoke federal jurisdiction to enforce a warranty only after they have presented
their grievance to such a non-binding forum. This would be a rare outcome,
but the possibility left the consumer with some modicum of power in his or her
relationship with the seller. The Act also expressly proscribes "deceptive war-
ranties," defined in part as those failing "to contain information which is neces-
sary in light of all of the circumstances, to make the warranty not misleading to
a reasonable individual exercising due care" or those whose terms limit their
"scope and application as to deceive a reasonable individual."92
88 See, e.g., Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000), cert denied sub
nom., Johnson v. Tele-Cash, Inc., 531 U.S. 1145 (2001).
89 See generally Cappalli, supra note 83; Jean R. Stemlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitra-
tion Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1
(2000); Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts:
A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REv. 1237 (2001); Christina S. Lewis, Class Actions vs.
Arbitration: Does TILA Support Class Actions in Arbitration Where Statutory Rights Are
Concerned?, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 133.
90 Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301-12.
9' 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(1).
92 "The comprehensive disclosure requirements of Magnuson-Moss are an integral, if not
the central, feature of the Act, perhaps eclipsing even the civil action and informal dispute
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Any dispute resolution clause in a contract for the sale of consumer goods
in interstate commerce, that reduced the access of consumers to law courts to
enforce express warranties, would seem to violate the Act, the sole exception
being a clause authorizing non-binding arbitration conducted in an ADR pro-
gram approved by the Federal Trade Commission. Moreover, a clause lessen-
ing the ability of the consumer to enforce a warranty could be properly seen as
"deceptive" and thus a substantive violation of the Act. Indeed, what could be
more deceptive than a written warranty tucked inside a package that requires a
consumer to assert any claim for its breach in a prohibitively distant or expen-
sive forum?93
Congress was explicit in the Magnuson-Moss Act that it did not intend in
any way to pre-empt state law remedies for breach of implied warranties of
merchantabilty imposed by the Uniform Commercial Code.94 Such remedies
might be pursued in state court or federal court if an independent basis for
federal jurisdiction were available. Of course, the 1975 Act did not override
the Federal Arbitration Act because, in 1975, the 1925 Act was not thought to
be applicable to consumer transactions. It is now being contended, however,
that the 1925 Act, as rewritten by the Supreme Court after its enactment, over-
rides the Magnuson-Moss Act by allowing the seller of consumer goods to
impose on the unwary consumer mandatory binding arbitration in a forum not
approved by the Federal Trade Commission.9 5 That interpretation of the legis-
lation is at odds with utterances of the Federal Trade Commission, designated
by Congress as the overseer of compliance with the Act.9 6 It is contended,
however, that the FTC's policy is not an expression of the necessary Congres-
sional intent to preclude arbitration, that only Congress itself can articulate an
exception to the Supreme Court's national policy.97
It is true that the Act, in its provisions encouraging non-binding arbitra-
tion, manifested a hope of Congress that civil juries would not be needed to
enforce warranties. But, while the Magnuson-Moss Act encourages more ami-
resolution mechanisms in their importance to consumers." CURTIS R. RErrz, CONSUMER
PROTECTION UNDER THE MAGNUSON- Moss WARRANTY ACT 31 (1978).
" E.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); cf. Brower v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (App. Div. 1998).
9' HOWARD J. ALPERIN & ROLAND F. CHASE, 2 CONSUMER LAW: SALES PRACTICES AND
REGULATION § 214 (1986) (describing design of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act as comple-
menting rather than superseding state warranty law). See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Tex. Motor
Vehicle Comm'n, 755 F.2d 1192, 1205 (5th Cir. 1985).
95 See Richardson v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2001). But see
Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 958 (W.D. Va. 2000); Wilson v.
Waverlee Homes, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 1530 (M.D. Ala. 1997), aff'd 127 F.3d 40 (1 1th Cir.
1997).
96 See 40 FED. REG. 60.168, 60.211 (1975) (stating "reference within the written warranty to
any binding, non-judicial remedy is prohibited by the Rule and the Act"); 16 C.F.R.
§ 702.50). The Commission stated shortly after passage of the Act that nothing in
Magnuson-Moss prevents warrantors from offering binding arbitration options to consumers
after non-binding informal dispute settlement mechanisms have been completed. 40 FED.
REG. 60.168, 60.211 (1975). More recently, the FTC has reiterated that warrantors are not
precluded from offering consumers a binding arbitration option after a warranty dispute has
arisen. 60 FED. REG. 19.700, 19.708 (1999).
17 Katie Wiechens, Arbitrating Consumer Claims Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,
68 U. Cn. L. REV. 1459, 1469-86 (2001).
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able alternatives, it, like the Truth in Lending Act, explicitly anticipates the use
of the class action" as a last resort to correct the behavior of predatory sellers
of consumer goods who make their sales with the help of deceptive warranties
or whose transgressions are too minor to warrant individual lawsuits.9 9 A party
bound by an arbitration clause in an adhesion contract is thereby excluded from
participation in a class action.1 °° A business that includes such a clause in all
its consumer contracts can thus elude the risk of class action enforcement of
Magnuson-Moss at the same time that it defeats enforcement of Truth in
Lending.
In addition, the Magnuson-Moss Act provides a one-way fee shift as a
bounty to the successful plaintiffs lawyer to encourage private law enforce-
ment. 0  An arbitrator may enforce such an entitlement, but on the other hand
it may not.1 0 2 Indeed, an arbitrator is free to forsake the American rule and tax
fees against an unsuccessful plaintiff,"0 3 thereby discouraging private law
enforcement fostered by the Act.
Predispute arbitration clauses in consumer transactions should be espe-
cially suspect. It is fanciful to speak of such instruments as contractual for they
are anything but an expression of mutual assent. Like bills of lading or insur-
ance policies, they are inherently unreadable to most citizens, and few consum-
ers are contemplating a future dispute at the time they are making a
purchase. " Like other provisions in contracts of adhesion, they should be
carefully scrutinized by any court asked to enforce them. However, unless
lower federal courts are in error in their reading of the Supreme Court's
"national policy," a vendor of consumer goods can substantially gut the
Magnuson-Moss Act by writing an expedient predispute arbitration clause into
his written bill of sale form.' 5 And it seems likely that many are now doing
so.
98 15 U.S.C. § 2310(e). In this respect, the Act was like the Truth in Lending Act, erected
on the foundation laid by the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
promulgated by the Court.
99 See note 16, supra. See, e.g., Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
oo E.g., Dominium Austin Partners L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2001).
101 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(2).
102 See infra Part III for an explanation of the customary lack of an enforceable duty of
arbitrators to render awards conforming to law.
"03 E.g., Donel Corp. v. Kother Overseers Ass'n of Am. Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2314
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
1o See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47
STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995).
105 In Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of Georgia, Inc., 253 F.3d 611 (11 th Cir. 2001), the
court held that a third party beneficiary to a consumer contract cannot enforce an arbitration
clause that does not explicitly provide for such enforcement. Perhaps with some diffidence,
it explained that:
[Tlhe FTC has noted, the 'requirement of minimum uniformity in warranty disclosures should
enable consumers to make valid and informed comparisons of warranties for similar products'
.... Allowing Fleetwood to condition the warranty by invoking an arbitration agreement exe-
cuted by the buyer and seller confounds this purpose in that consumers confronted with warran-
ties that do not contain arbitration clauses that are nonetheless subject to arbitration will have no
basis for judging the suitability of a warranty. This is of particular concern because the warranty
is issued unilaterally, and, as the enactors of Magnuson-Moss noted, a consumer cannot bargain
with manufacturers to adjust the terms of a warranty offered voluntarily by the manufacturer:
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F. The Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970
RICO' 0 6 was yet another law enacted to encourage private attorneys gen-
eral to punish predatory business practices. The statute is chiefly a criminal
law, but one provision authorizes law enforcement in civil actions brought by
private counsel and subject to the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury.' °7
To win a RICO civil case, the plaintiff has to prove the elements of the criminal
case, but does not have to overcome the presumption of innocence faced by a
public prosecutor seeking a verdict of conviction.' °8 The case to be proved,
whether in a civil or in a criminal proceeding, is that a defendant has engaged
in a pattern of activities of the sort enumerated in the Act; these include diverse
forms of fraud, bribery, and extortion.'0 9 The role of the plaintiff as a private
attorney general is confirmed by statutory provisions for treble damages and
one-way fee-shifting.
Despite these features of the law, the Court held in 1987 that civil RICO
claims are not to be distinguished from antitrust claims with respect to their
arbitrability under the 1925 Act." 0 Again, it seems clear that no one voting for
the Act in 1970 could have anticipated the possibility that the Court would
impose its "national policy" extending the Federal Arbitration Act into almost
every corner of the legal landscape. In 1970, it would have been quite clear
that the 1925 Act did not apply to claims under the Act.
The extent of the impairment of RICO enforcement is a matter for specu-
lation. One Court of Appeals has held that an arbitrator may (but of course
need not) award treble damages under the Act.' 11 Nevertheless, it seems clear
that the Congressional purpose in imposing civil liability on offenders was
made less likely of attainment by the imposition of the Court's arbitration pol-
icy. Businessmen who fear the risk of liability for fraud, bribery, or intimida-
tion can gain some comfort by imposing predispute arbitration clauses on those
with whom they deal, with the arbitration to be conducted without civil discov-
ery or the American rule on fee-shifting by a tribunal bearing no resemblance
to a jury.
G. State Laws Regulating Contracts
Thus far, we have considered only the Court's national policy of weak
enforcement of federal laws regulating business. Its weakening of state law
regulating business has been, if possible, more complete. A majority of the
'[t]he warranty provisions of [Magnuson-Moss] are not only designed to make warranties under-
standable to consumers, but to redress the ill effects resulting from the imbalance which pres-
ently exists in the relative bargaining power of consumers and suppliers of consumer products.'
The unilateral nature of warranties by manufacturers makes full disclosure in a single document
mandatory for the attainment of Congress's goals.
Id. at 623 (second, third alterations in original) (citations omitted).
106 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. (2000).
107 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2000).
108 See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
109 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1970).
Io Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
"1 See Kerr-McGee Refining Corp. v. M/T Triumph, 924 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1991).
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members of the present Court have acknowledged at one time or another that
this was a dreadful mistake.
The critical decision came in 1984 in Southland Corp. v. Keating. 112 The
Court there interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act to preempt a provision in the
California Franchise Investment Act voiding mandatory arbitration clauses in
franchise agreements made between local enterprises and national or interna-
tional ones." 3 As dissenting Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist observed at the
time, this interpretation was contrary to any purpose ever expressed by Con-
gress."' Congress had acted in 1925 to shield state law governing commercial
transactions from an intrusive federal judiciary. The Court in 1984, instead of
enforcing the national law protecting the legislative jurisdiction of the states,
created its "national policy favoring arbitration." That "national policy" has
been applied to frustrate every effort of states to employ their courts to enforce
regulations of business, whether in its relations to consumers, employees, or
any other individuals who might be victimized by the exercise of superior eco-
nomic power. As dissenting Justice Stevens observed at the time, the decision
in Southland was contrary to the long-established principles of preemption that
dictate that preemption "in a field traditionally occupied by state law" occurs
only when Congress clearly expresses that intent, and then no more than abso-
lutely necessary to effect the Congressional purpose." 5 Those principles are
exemplified in the treatment of the federal regulatory laws discussed above, as
each was assigned minimal or no preemptive effect except insofar as Congress
clearly expressed an intent to preempt. Congress has never expressed any pur-
pose of pre-empting state laws that limit freedom of contract or authorize pri-
vate enforcement of legislative policy, save perhaps in the field of health care
insurance.' 1
6
It is true that the law of most states favors arbitration as an informal
method of resolving contract disputes. The Uniform Arbitration Act expres-
sing that policy has been fairly widely enacted." 17
Nevertheless, all states also regulate contracts. For example, the terms of
insurance policies written and sold by insurers are regulated in every state.118
It is the premise of insurance regulation that citizens cannot be expected to read
and understand the intricate terms of the policies they buy. No state would
allow an insurance company to write a clause into an insurance policy authoriz-
ing an arbitrator not bound by law to act as the authoritative interpreter of the
instrument. Insurance policies are perhaps more difficult to read than most
printed contracts, but they are on the other hand more likely to be read and
considered than documents intended to govern transactions with consumers, or
112 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
1 3 Id. at 10.
114 Id. at 25-29.
15 Id. at 18 (Perhaps the Court has generally relaxed its traditional self-restraint in finding
state laws to be pre-empted.). See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 549-
51 (2001); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 866 (2000).
116 E.g., United States Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(2002).
117 MacNeil et. al., supra note 70, at § 5.4.2.
118 SPENCER KIMBALL & WERNER PFENNIGSTORF, THE REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPA-
NIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 12 (1981).
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employment manuals that the employee knows to be quite non-negotiable.
Congress has disavowed any intent to preempt state insurance laws'19 with
such clarity that even the Supreme Court would presumably agree that insur-
ance policies are not subject to the Federal Arbitration Act.
But conventional American contract law, expressed in the American Law
Institute's Restatement of Contracts' 2 ° and in the Uniform Commercial
Code' 2 ' adopted in every state, cautions against the enforcement of overbearing
terms in other printed "adhesion" contracts. One of the first cases refusing to
enforce dictated terms in such a "contract" was decided as a matter controlled
by federal common law by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1889, in
the days of its strongest commitment to freedom of contract.1 22 The contract
law of no state allows parties to contract out of its regulatory laws, or to write
unconscionable terms into printed forms recording routine transactions. It is
perhaps the law in all states that it is unconscionable for a party who is a
''repeat player" to write into a standard form contract a dispute resolution
clause having the effect of stripping the "single-shot player" of procedural
rights useful in private enforcement of laws enacted to deter predatory behavior
by businesses. "Single-shot players" might be consumers, employees, patients,
franchisees, and others who are not in a position to evaluate and resist onerous
provisions disabling them from performing the role of private attorney general.
So far as I am able to detect, no legislature, state or federal, has ever
knowingly authorized parties to write predispute arbitration agreements into
contracts of adhesion. Nor has any state supreme court repudiated the long-
standing and widely shared practice of disregarding business self-deregulation
through contracts with vulnerable parties. But many states have enacted many
diverse laws to protect consumers, employees, and small businesses. Most
such laws are privately enforceable in state courts with civil juries.
Thus, the specific California law invalidated in 1984 was not unusual;
many states have legislation enacted to protect franchisees other than automo-
bile dealers from predatory contract provisions. Because franchise agreements
are commercial transactions resembling the contracts for the sale of goods in
interstate commerce that Congress had in mind in 1925, the Court could have
limited the 1984 decision preempting state law invalidating predispute arbitra-
tion clauses to contracts between business men who are presumably advised by
counsel and who might possibly be expected to walk away from a deal infected
with a dispute resolution clause stripping them of substantive rights not derived
from the contract, or to exact a price for such a clause in other terms of the
agreement.
No such distinction was made. In 1995, the Supreme Court extended its
application of the Federal Act to preempt Alabama law protecting consumers of
services from mandatory arbitration clauses in standard form contracts.' 23 The
consumer in that case had ill advisedly signed a printed contract for the
removal of termites from his home without deleting a provision requiring him
"9 McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (2002).
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211.
121 Id. at § 2-302.
122 Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 441-42 (1889).
123 Allied Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995).
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to make any claim for breach of warranty to an arbitrator to be appointed by the
American Arbitration Association. Twenty state attorneys general filed an ami-
cus brief calling the Court's attention to the consequences of the 1984 interpre-
tation of the 1925 Act. They made the point that much law in most if not all
states that regulates business practices is privately enforced by individual attor-
neys general and that arbitration clauses often serve to deter and even prevent
such enforcement. Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, reassured the states'
attorneys general that their governments were not preempted from regulating
standard form contracts so long as the regulation did not discriminate against
arbitration clauses. He underscored the language of Section 2 of the 1925 Act
providing that an arbitration clause may be held invalid "upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." These grounds
would seem clearly to include unconscionability.
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the termite case, justified her vote on the
ground that she felt bound by the doctrine of precedent to adhere to the Court's
1984 interpretation, wrong though she continued to think that it had been. Per-
haps she was also explaining the votes of Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, who
had also dissented in the earlier case. Justice Thomas was not persuaded by her
appeal to precedent and dissented on the grounds stated in her 1984 dissent.
Justice Scalia also dissented, acknowledging that his support of the 1984 deci-
sion had been so erroneous that the Court had a duty to reverse it whenever five
votes could be assembled for that purpose.
Thus, there are five members of the present Supreme Court who have
stated in judicial opinions that the 1984 decision was erroneous and in need of
correction by Congress. The other four members of the Court have reassured
us that the power lies in state legislatures to regulate standard form contracts so
long as they do not discriminate against arbitration clauses. Not a single Justice
of the present Court has openly avowed the belief that federal arbitration law
should impede or prevent enforcement of state laws regulating business prac-
tices and limiting freedom of contract as applied to consumers or employees.
The New Mexico legislature has responded to Justice Breyer's invitation,' 2 4
and perhaps others will soon follow. We ought to hope so.
However, the lower federal courts have been prone to deploy the Court's
"national policy" to effect change not only in state law providing for judicial
enforcement of business regulation legislation, but also in the state law of con-
sumer and employment contracts. In order to resolve all doubts in favor of
arbitration, some federal courts have also resolved all doubts in favor of con-
tract, even where the existence of any mutual assent is more than dubious. This
has been most evident in the enforcement of arbitration clauses in package
inserts and the like.'2 5 The provisions of Section 2 of the Act emphasized by
124 See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to 44-7-22 (Michie 2001).
125 Sajida A. Mahdi, Gateway to Arbitration: Issues of Contract Formation Under the
U.C.C. and The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses Included in Standard Form Contracts
Shipped with Goods, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 403, 417 (2001).
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Justice Breyer in his reassurance to the state attorneys general have been widely
disregarded. '
2 6
III. THE LIMITATIONS OF ARBITRATION AS A METHOD OF
LAW ENFORCEMENT
The Supreme Court has concealed, perhaps from itself, the consequences
of its misdeeds by repeatedly asserting that arbitration is just another way of
enforcing one's legal rights. 127 The Court would have us believe that those
who impose predispute arbitration clauses on consumers and employees are
merely serving the public interest in saving legal costs. Frequent repetition by
the highest authority does not make the words true. The Court notwithstanding,
commercial arbitration as it has developed in the United States is not a legal
process and differs in vital ways from the adjudication of rights by courts.
There are at least five fundamental differences.
First, there are concerns regarding the identity of arbitrators. Even if the
issue is only one of contract interpretation, "Who interprets ... will frequently
be more significant than what the applicable law says about the agreement." 128
The arbitrators appointed pursuant to form contracts are generally screened by
an arbitration organization accustomed to serving business interests.129 The
arbitrators employed by such institutions are almost all formerly connected to
business enterprise, or they are former judges whose judicial work was
approved by businessmen. 130 Prospective jurors with the same connections
would be excused from sitting on many of the cases that the arbitrators decide.
It is not unlikely that such decision makers will, at least unconsciously, tend to
favor "repeat players" who may select them to decide future disputes against
"single shot players" such as consumers or employees who are not likely ever
to need their services again.13 1 Also, arbitrators are commissioned by contract
and are therefore likely to be more diligent and effective in enforcing contract
obligations than in enforcing statutes that intrude on the freedom of contract.
While good arbitrators certainly try to overcome these sources of bias, and may
often even succeed in doing so, there is no way that they can overcome the
appearance of bias that is certain to diminish the optimism of individual claim-
ants engaged in a dispute with a business firm. In this respect, appearance is
126 Charles Davant IV, Note, Tripping on the Threshold: Federal Courts' Failure to
Observe Controlling State Law Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 51 DUKE L.J. 521, 538
(2001).
127 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634 n.18
(1985); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 538-42 (1995).
128 William W. Park, When and Why Arbitration Matters, in THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO
JUSTICE 73, 75 (G. M. Beresford Hartwell ed., 1997).
129 On the commercial nature of these institutions, see Reynolds Holding, Private Justice
Part H, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, October 8, 2001, at 5-6.
130 Id. at 7-8.
131 This suspected bias has been given some confirmation in an empirical study by Profes-
sor Lisa Bingham of the Indiana University Business School. Lisa Bingham, On Repeat
Players, Adhesion Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment
Arbitration Awards, 29 McGEOROE L. REV. 228, 233 (1998). See also Lisa Bingham,
Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMPL. RTS. & EMPL. POLICY 189
(1997) (acknowledging that her data is inconclusive as to the reality of bias).
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more important than reality because it is the appearance that controls the settle-
ment value of claims, and most claims are settled.
132
More fundamentally objectionable than the appearance of conflicts of
interest of arbitrators is that they are not jurors selected to represent the com-
munity at large. In its authorization of self-deregulation, the Court has savaged
not only the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, but
also the similar provisions of state constitutions empowering citizen-jurors to
regulate the conduct of businessmen in their community. The Court in 1973
manifested its indifference to the institution of the civil jury by authorizing the
jury in federal courts to be halved in size,' 3 3 thereby assuring that there would
be more exceptional juries and more exceptional verdicts of the sort to which
critics of private law enforcement can point. 1 34 No Congress would have
enacted such a "reform" of the jury, nor have states followed the federal prac-
tice in that regard.
1 35
As noted above, numerous laws have been enacted by Congress to regu-
late business that were clearly drafted with the expectation that they would be
enforced by civil juries. And many states have long regarded predispute waiv-
ers of the right to trial by jury as voidable in order to protect the rights of
weaker parties to contracts. 1 36 Any such law has been set aside by the Court's
preemption decisions.
Second, arbitrators need not be lawyers and are not required to know or
enforce law. Where jury verdicts are subject to review to assure their fidelity to
law, arbitral awards are not. As noted, arbitrators in the United States are free
to do equity or justice as they see it, and may render Solomonic awards giving a
little something to each party to a dispute. They need not explain the reasons
for an award and their decisions are rarely, if ever, subject to review on the
substantive merits. 137 While this feature of traditional arbitration practice is
subject to modification by contract, 138 it would be surprising indeed to find it
132 Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Regulation of Settlement, 46
STAN. L. REv. 9 (1994).
133 Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159-160 (1973).
I" Richard 0. Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research
and the Jury Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643, 651-53 (1975). See also MICHAEL SAKS,
JURY VERDICTS: THE ROLE OF GROUP SIZE AND SOCIAL DECISION RULES (1977).
135 Some states do use smaller juries for the resolution of some disputes, and may make
other accommodations. See Developments in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV.
1408, 1480-83 (1997).
136 Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference
for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due
Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV, 1 (1997).
137 E.g., Major League Baseball Players Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 502, 511 (2001) (While
the Court has sometimes reassured us that arbitrators must obey statutory law, lower federal
courts have generally disregarded that reassurance.). See also Edward Brunet, Toward
Changing Models of Securities Regulation, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1473-74 (1996); Hill v.
Norfolk & W. Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1194-95 (7th Cir. 1987) (containing an emphatic threat
from Judge Richard Posner to punish suits seeking to overturn arbitration awards).
138 Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration,
74 TUL. L. REV. 39, 47 (1999); Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8
AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 225, 239 (1997); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Man-
agement, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 831, 885-86.
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modified in an arbitration clause in a printed contract presented to a consumer
or employee.
Third, arbitrators in the United States have no enforceable duty to inquire
into the facts. While they have a subpoena power, 139 they need not use it, and
parties presenting their cases to an arbitrator have no right to compel the testi-
mony of witnesses or the production of documents unless the arbitrator chooses
to require it. The lack of access to adversary discovery of evidence (such as
state and federal courts allow) can, for example, prevent an automobile dealer
or filling station owner from investigating possible violations of the antitrust
laws of the United States or other state or federal laws enacted to protect local
dealers or franchisees that make predatory intent an element of a plaintiffs
claim. There is no requirement that a record be kept of the evidence considered
by an arbitrator.
Fourth, arbitrators in the United States cannot administer the full array of
legal remedies available in court. They are not generally able to provide pre-
liminary injunctions for those in need of that form of relief. While they can
utter commands to a party, they have no contempt power enabling them to
enforce any command regarding the future behavior of a party and can only
hope for judicial support to compel compliance. They are sometimes legally
disabled from awarding exemplary damages 140 or imposing penalties or boun-
ties conferred by statute.
Fifth, arbitration is not an open public process. It is clear that this is one
of its attractions to predatory business because it diminishes the likelihood that
the success of one claim by a consumer or employee will encourage others like
it. Secrecy can also be achieved by settlement, but the settling claimant is
always compensated for his or her forbearance. It may reasonably be ques-
tioned whether documents and other material uncovered by a private attorney
general or personal injury plaintiff should ever be withheld from public view.
A public enforcement proceeding also alerts the general public to the need for
regulation and enables them to measure the usefulness of their legal institu-
tions. Secret proceedings or suppressed discovery material conceal from the
public not only the risk of the harm at issue, but also an awareness that the
public at large is being served by the law enforcement efforts of their fellow
citizens.' Meanwhile, the business defendant resolving disputes secretly
knows all about any successful claims and can guide itself accordingly while
his or her adversary negotiates in ignorance.
In many of these respects, American arbitration law is to be distinguished
from the law and practice of international commercial arbitration. Tradition-
ally, the arbitrators in international commercial practice involving businessmen
on both sides are appointed by a group having no connection to either party,
thus neutralizing the influence of the repeat player. Often, there are three arbi-
"' E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 7; NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, UNIFROM ARBITRATION ACT § 7.
140 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Smart,
Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U. L. REv. 953 (1986). But cf. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
141 Adriaan Lanni, Protecting Public Rights in Private Arbitration, 107 YALE L.J. 1157,
1161 (1999).
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trators, a custom rare in American commercial practice because it materially
elevates the cost. Indeed, international commercial arbitration may be much
more expensive than litigation in the courts of any country. Arbitration con-
ducted under conventional international standards is usually preferred by those
engaged in international commerce only because it is perceived to be a means
of securing a neutral forum. In addition, it is customary in international prac-
tice for the award to include a finding of facts and a statement of reasons link-
ing the decision to the controlling law.' 42 In some systems, such as that of the
International Chamber of Commerce, there is even a possibility of appellate
review of sorts.' 4 3 In any event, it is almost universally agreed in international
practice that the arbitration panel is to enforce the law, not weigh the equities.
The most commonly used rules of international commercial arbitration explic-
itly forbid arbitrators to decide "ex aequo et bono" as amiable compositeurs of
business relationships, unless the parties ask for such cheerful conciliation
service.'"4
Mandatory arbitration pursuant to a predispute agreement should also be
contrasted with consensual arbitration undertaken on an agreement between
parties having knowledge of what is at stake in an existing dispute. Arbitration
under those circumstances can save real costs. The agreement of parties to
submit a case to arbitration reflects a level of mutual trust facilitating the volun-
tary exchange of information and evidence. They are also in a position to insist
that the arbitrator be a person unlikely to be influenced by the relative fre-
quency with which the parties might become future employers of the arbitrator.
And they are not unlikely to welcome the possibility that the arbitrator will try
to render a conciliatory award in lieu of straightforward enforcement of con-
trolling law.
The D.C. Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Harry Edwards, has sought to
confront some of these issues by imposing requirements on arbitration proceed-
ings involving employees' claims of statutory rights.1 45 These "minimal stan-
dards of due process" require, for example, that the arbitrator be a lawyer
schooled in the pertinent law who would write an opinion subject to judicial
review. 14 6 These standards are also reflected in Protocols observed by the
American Arbitration Association in handling employment and consumer dis-
putes. 14 7 But predatory businesses writing predispute arbitration clauses into
142 E.g., RULES OF ARBITRATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE Article
25 (1998); LONDON COURT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION RULES, Article 26 (1998).
143 Id., Article 27.
144 Id., Article 17; UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES, Article 33.
145 Legislation to protect non-unionized employees is not given full attention in this article.
Of all the laws enacted by Congress to regulate business, perhaps the least suited to
mandatory arbitration is the Fair Labor Standards Act. See, e.g., Bailey v. Ameriquest Mort-
gage Co., 2002 WL 1835642 (D. Minn. 2002).
146 Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1997); cf. Shankle v. B-
G Maint. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999); Hooters of Am., Inc., 173 F.3d 933,
941 (4th Cir. 1999); and see Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Adju-
dication of Public Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 645 (1995).
147 NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTE ADVIsORY COMMITTEE, DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL ON
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER DISPUTES (1998); DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL ON
MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF HEALTH CARE DISPUTES (1998); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
ARBITRATORS, GUIDELINES ON ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY CLAIMS UNDER EMPLOYER-
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forms used to record consumer or employment transactions need not employ
the AAA, and the opinion of Judge Edwards has not yet resonated outside the
field of employment contracts. It seems not unlikely that if his standards of due
process were applied to all mandatory predispute arbitration clauses, few would
be written. Even minimal due process would materially enhance the costs and
risks to the party writing the printed contract.
Many predispute arbitration agreements, as they are written, load the dice
to the advantage of the repeat player drafting the forms. The ARCO franchise
agreement clause previously adverted to is an example. 4 8 The draftsmen of
such forms are not satisfied merely to require the weaker individual party to
engage in arbitration, with its inherent inadequacies as a means of rights
enforcement, but they also add bells and whistles making the designated arbi-
tration forum especially ineffective as a means of enforcing one's legal rights.
They may seek to locate the arbitration at a distant place, or conduct it with an
institution charging an enormous filing fee, or reverse the American rule on
fee-shifting, or exclude the weaker party from participating in a class action, or
forbid an award of exemplary damages, or shorten the limitations period, or
make the individual promise to keep the award secret, or devise perhaps many
other impediments to effective private law enforcement. Some or perhaps
many of these bells and whistles may, as in the ARCO case, render the arbitra-
tion clause unenforceable. 14 9 But to the extent that they are valid, they magnify
the degree to which business can self de-regulate by means of arbitration
clauses in adhesion contracts.
A striking example of bells and whistles is provided by the contract AT&T
recently sought to impose on its California customers for long distance ser-
vice.' 5 ° It was laden with added features leading Judge Bernard Zimmerman,
in deciding a suit challenging the terms of that contract, to conclude that:
This lawsuit is not about arbitration. If all AT&T had done was to move customer
disputes that survive its informal resolution process from the courts to arbitration, its
actions likely would have been sanctioned by the state and federal policies favoring
arbitration. While that is what it suggested it was doing to its customers, it was really
doing much more; it was actually rewriting substantially the legal landscape on
which its customers must contend .... It is not just that AT&T wants to litigate in
the forum of its choice - arbitration; it is that AT&T wants to make it very difficult
for anyone to effectively vindicate her rights, even in that forum. That is illegal and
unconscionable and must be enjoined. 15 1
Even if my observations possibly overstate the weaknesses of arbitration
as a means of rights enforcement - as indeed they would if Judge Edwards' due
process requirements were universalized - they reflect the perceptions of most
lawyers whose clients are afflicted with mandatory arbitration clauses written
into adhesion contracts. The usually-intended effect of the predispute arbitra-
PROMULGATED SYSTEMS, DUE PROCESS PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF
STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1997). The Judi-
cial Arbitration and Mediation Service observes similar rules.
148 Graham Oil Co. v. ARCO Prods. Co., 43 F.3d 1244 (9th Cir. 1994).
149 See, e.g., Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002).
150 Ting v. AT&T, 182 F. Supp. 2d 902 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
151 Id. at 938-39.
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tion clause is to intimidate the weaker party, perhaps especially one whose
statutory rights threaten the client of the draftsman. While predispute arbitra-
tion clauses written into standard form adhesive contracts are thus not straight-
forward renunciations of the statutory rights of weaker parties, they often are,
as Judge Zimmerman states, restructurings of the legal landscape to be trav-
ersed by a claimant. Because arbitration is, for numerous reasons, less likely to
result in the enforcement of legal rights, a legal claim that can only be arbi-
trated has less value to the plaintiff than a legal claim that can be litigated in an
American court, and in some instances the settlement value may be reduced to
zero. It is sophistry to deny this practical effect, which has the secondary con-
sequence of weakening the enforcement of much law enacted to protect the
public from predatory behavior by those with economic power.
IV. ARBITRATION AS A MEANS OF SAVING LEGAL COSTS
In addition to the assurance offered by the Supreme Court that arbitration
is just another way of enforcing one's legal rights, the Court also assures those
resisting that mandatory arbitration is just as a means of saving legal costs. 52
Perhaps this assumption is the result of a conflation of predispute mandatory
arbitration and consensual arbitration that has unquestioned capacity to reduce
legal costs. It was indeed the assumption of the Magnuson-Moss Act that vol-
untary ADR can save legal costs and facilitate the assertions of rights by per-
sons of limited means in disputes of limited value. In diverse forms, including
mediation, non-binding arbitration, early neutral evaluation, as well as binding
arbitration, there may often be real opportunities to save costs.1 53 The problem
is that those drafting mandatory predispute arbitration clauses are not motivated
by any desire to facilitate the assertion of claims against themselves. The
Court's contrary assumption is one made in a legal skybox or perhaps in
fairyland.
We can be sure, of course, that mandatory arbitration does improve the
profit picture for the parties who write such clauses into their standard form
contracts. If that were not so, of course, the clauses would not be in the con-
tracts. It is also surely true that enforcement of mandatory arbitration clauses
relieves the public fisc of costs that they must bear when disputants litigate. It
also lightens the workloads of judges. In the latter respects, the question is
raised whether the investment of public resources in the enforcement of rights
and in the regulation of predatory business is a good investment. Those who
are regulated may think not; those whose interests are protected are likely to
disagree.
Possibly mandatory arbitration pursuant to a predispute agreement might
also incidentally relieve some individual parties to adhesion contracts of some
of their legal expenses. Cost saving is possible when the law applicable to the
events is reasonably settled and the factual issues are uncomplicated and
require the use of no special expertise. The Supreme Court, in enforcing a
152 This is the premise of Green Tree Financial Corporation of Alabama v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79 (2000).
153 For a brief summary, see Judith A. McMorrow, The Advocate as Witness: Understand-
ing Context, Culture and Client, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 945, 972-75 (2001).
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mandatory arbitration agreement in 2000, indicated that it might not enforce
such an agreement if it appeared that arbitration would be more expensive for
the weaker party to the agreement. 154 It would, however, be remarkable if
mandatory arbitration clauses were intended by those who write them to
strengthen the prospective bargaining positions of their adversaries by reducing
their costs relative to those of the party writing the standard form. Neverthe-
less, the Court requires proof that this is so.
Economic theorists can and do argue that individuals benefit indirectly
from the savings accruing to the corporate enterprise or the government in the
form of lower prices or higher wages, and lower taxes. 1 55 No doubt some cost
savings are passed on as a result of market pressures. This is likely to be the
case in markets featuring intense price or wage competition, such as the market
for long-distance telephone service. It is, however, by no means clear that a
prudent person of the sort envisioned by economic theory would trade a minor
reduction in the price of goods and services, or a minor increase in wages, for a
material reduction in his or her ability to enforce his or her rights under statutes
enacted to protect such persons from their weakness. And redistribution of
some of the savings in the form of lower prices or higher wages does nothing to
deter or correct corporate misconduct, so that the public interest in law enforce-
ment by private attorneys general is consistently disserved by mandatory arbi-
tration clauses when applied to claims of statutory rights.
As suggested, the savings on legal expenses, if that is in the public inter-
est, could be maximized simply by repealing laws enacted to regulate contracts
to protect consumers, workers, patients, franchisees, and others. However,
none of the latter-day champions of freedom of contract are heard to advocate
repeal of any of the laws whose enforcements they would impede. Implicit in
regulatory legislation by Congress and state legislatures are their economic
determinations that (a) it is worth the cost to the public fisc to provide a public
forum in which the individual rights conferred can be effectively enforced and
the public interests served, (b) the business competitors whose conduct is regu-
lated should bear the costs incident to effective private enforcement of laws
enacted to deter their predatory impulses, and (c) the citizens protected benefit
more from having enforceable rights than from having marginally lower prices
or higher wages.
V. CONCLUSION
There are those who applaud the Court's national policy. One such group
are persons whom Justice Stevens denoted as believers that arbitration is "an
institution designed to implement a formula for world peace."' 56 The ADR
movement has been a shelter for that sentiment, although some of its more
ardent theorists have come to recognize that they have been ill-used.' 57 Also
154 See Green Tree, 531 U.S. 79.
151 See, e.g., Christopher E. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv.
695 (2001).
156 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 665 (1985).
157 E.g., Carrie Menkel Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial
Systems? Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 19 (1999).
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sharing that faith are many professionals who make a living from arbitration;
they include those active in the American Arbitration Association, JAMS, and
other similar organizations. A second constituency is members of the federal
judiciary who see arbitration as a device for relieving themselves of part of
their workloads or for preventing the dilution of their status by obviating the
need to create additional judgeships. A third are economic theorists who sup-
pose that the saving of legal costs is passed on to consumers and employees,
generously compensating them for the weakening of their ability to enforce
their rights with lower prices or higher wages.1 58 Politically more important
than any of these groups is the fourth who are the members of the United States
Chamber of Commerce and who see mandatory arbitration as a boon to their
bottom lines because it liberates them from effective enforcement of unwel-
come regulation.
However, the Court's "national policy favoring arbitration" has no basis in
any legislative enactment or indeed any expression by any political body, state
or federal, that is accountable to the people. In insisting on the application of
predispute arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts to the resolution of claims
of statutory rights, the Court has erred, in some respects reflecting an optimism
characteristic of the tulip bulb or dot-com mentality. It was unfounded opti-
mism to suppose, contrary to reality and common sense, that the purpose of
such contract provisions is merely to save needless expense on all sides. It was
similarly unfounded optimism for the Court to embrace notions regarding free-
dom of contract that manifest ignorance of, or indifference to, the frailties of
their fellow citizens who lack the time, the interest, the foresight, the energy,
and especially the power to renegotiate adhesion contracts to protect them-
selves from predatory business.
No legislature or court accountable to the people would have made the
errors made by the Court in its radical re-writing of the Federal Arbitration Act.
What it has achieved has been a serious impairment of the tradition of private
law enforcement and the creation of a system of self-deregulation comforting to
business predators.
158 For an application of this view, see Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Vol-
untary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 83 (1996); Stephen J. Ware, Consumer Arbitration as
Exceptional Consumer Law (With a Contractualist Reply to Carrington & Haagen), 29
McGEORGE L. REv. 195 (1998).
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